![]() ![]() The possibility that this elusive quarry could turn up at a mass as low as 125 GeV was not widely appreciated until the late 1980s, when theories involving supersymmetry began to suggest the possibility of such a light Higgs boson emerging from collisions. In hindsight, the LHC was (somewhat fortuitously) more appropriately sized to its primary scientific goal: the discovery of the Higgs boson. The resulting polarization of the US physics community helped undermine what had been fairly broad support for the SSC project in the House of Representatives, which in 1989 had voted 331–92 to proceed with construction. In the US, the only mechanism available was for disgruntled scientists to complain openly, which Philip Anderson of Princeton University, Theodore Geballe of Stanford University, Rustum Roy of the Pennsylvania State University, and others did in prominent guest editorials or in congressional hearings when SSC costs got out of hand between 19. The LHC project consequently had to be tailored to address such concerns before the council would grant it final approval. In that manner, European scientists in other disciplines have a valuable voice in CERN governing circles. That supple governing structure helps keep control of a project within the hands of the scientists involved and hinders government officials from intervening directly.īecause the council must also address the wider interests of individual European ministries, CERN leaders have to be sensitive to the pressures that the annual budget, new projects, and cost overruns can exert on other worthy science. Serious problems that arose with the LHC-for example, a large cost overrun in 2001-were addressed in the council, which represents the relevant ministries of its member nations and generally operates by consensus, especially on major laboratory initiatives. ![]() ![]() Nor did the LHC project face annual congressional appropriations battles and threats of termination, as did major US projects like the SSC and the space station. Unlike in the US, the director general or project manager could not be subpoenaed to appear before a parliamentary investigations subcommittee or be required to testify under oath about its management lapses or cost overruns-as SSC director Roy Schwitters had to do before Congress. Having faced problems similar to, though not as severe as, what the SSC project experienced, the LHC’s completion raises an obvious question: Why did CERN and its partner nations succeed where the US had failed?ĬERN also enjoys an enviable internal structure, overseen by its governing council, that largely insulates its leaders and scientists from the inevitable political infighting and machinations of member nations. 7 (The SSC, by comparison, was designed for 40 TeV collision energy.) When labor costs and in-kind contributions from participating nations are included, the total LHC price tag approached $10 billion, a figure often given in the press. Although the LHC project also experienced trying growth problems and cost overruns-its cost increased from an estimated 2.8 billion Swiss francs ($2.3 billion at the time) in 1996 to more than 4.3 billion Swiss francs in 2009-it managed to survive and become the machine that allowed the Higgs-boson discovery using only about half of its originally designed 14 TeV energy. Serious design efforts begun during the late 1980s and early 1990s ramped up after the SSC’s termination. In contrast, CERN followed a genuinely international approach in the design and construction of its successful Large Hadron Collider (LHC), albeit at a much more leisurely pace than had been the case for the SSC.
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